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INTRODUCTION 
After Wilbur was found guilty, there was no questioning his immediate fu-
ture. The executioner led the convicted criminal to the public square near city 
hall, where he would be formally put to death before a crowd. His actions were 
truly depraved; the tribunal had found Wilbur guilty of killing a child in a par-
ticularly gruesome manner. The tribunal had sentenced Wilbur to be tortured 
and hanged for his crime. The torture would be of the same nature as that he 
committed: mutilation and dismemberment. The sentence was carried out: the 
executioner with a new pair of gloves, the defendant in a new set of clothes, all 
paid for at the public’s expense. 
                                                        
*  Student at William S. Boyd School of Law. 
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This may seem like a barbaric punishment to impose upon Wilbur. Indeed, 
the punishment was a clear application of lex talionis—the “retributive princi-
ple of taking an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.”1 Today, the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has unquestionably helped foster a society 
that repudiates such primitive punishments.2 However, many laymen and 
scholars alike still believe that someone like Wilbur deserves to suffer for his 
wrongdoing and that desires for revenge are both just and moral.3 After all, 
how can it be that he could exact such mental anguish upon the family, or such 
physical pain upon the child, and not have to experience such suffering him-
self? How would we feel about Wilbur if he had taken our child’s life? 
It may not surprise you to learn that Wilbur’s story is true; the trial and ex-
ecution occurred in 1386 in Falaise, France.4 However, an important element 
has been omitted from the story: Wilbur was not man, but rather, an ordinary 
French pig.5 Had you initially known this, would your reaction towards Wil-
bur’s punishment have been the same? Does the pig really deserve to suffer for 
his crime? Although we want to protect other children by containing the pig, 
does one feel a need to exact revenge on the pig? 
The criminal prosecution of animals is no stranger to history,6 but today it 
seems like the sentencing of animals is peculiar, if not entirely absurd. So why 
is it we no longer feel the need to punish animals formally for their wrongdo-
ings? For the same reason that we are hesitant to punish the insane: we do not 
believe the actor had the capacity to “choose” to engage in his or her criminal 
behavior.7 That is to say, animals “have no alternative but to conform with the 
                                                        
1  E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 140 
(1906). 
2  The Eighth Amendment states in its entirety, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend 
VIII. The United States Supreme Court has stated that this amendment prohibits “punish-
ments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” such as disem-
boweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share “the delib-
erate infliction of pain for the sake of pain.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008). 
3  See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for 
Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1135 (2004) 
(“[P]unishments which include an element of suffering are just, and [] it is also moral for a 
society to mete out criminal punishment for the purpose of causing the wrong doer to experi-
ence suffering.”). 
4  EVANS, supra note 1. However, “Wilbur” was not the actual name of the pig (I can only 
presume), and the pig was female rather than male. Id. 
5  And yes, the pig was dressed up in human clothing. Id. 
6  See generally id. (describing the history of the criminal prosecution of animals). 
7  See Brian D. Shannon, The Time Is Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense: An Essay, 
39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67, 72–73 (2006) (“In general, behavior is the product of choice, and 
people who make bad choices are subject to moral condemnation. In cases where mental dis-
ease or defect robs people of the capacity to choose not to engage in criminal behavior, the 
argument concludes, it is inappropriate to condemn them morally and therefore inappropriate 
to convict them of a crime.”). Another reason why we do not hold trials for animals is a di-
minished belief in demonic possession. See EVANS, supra note 1, at 4–8 (noting the church’s 
general belief in demonic possession throughout the Middle Ages). However, as it was likely 
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promptings of their genetically implanted instincts. Thus, we do not subject 
them to moral praise or blame.”8 
Although scholars have long argued, and will surely continue to argue, 
what it means to have “free will,” it seems clear that most people, most of the 
time, equate free will with an ability to “choose” among alternatives.9 As biol-
ogist Jerry Coyne phrases it, “if you could rerun the tape of your life up to the 
moment you make a choice, with every aspect of the universe configured iden-
tically, free will means that your choice could have been different.”10 Without 
the ability to choose between different actions, punishing animals or the insane 
simply because they deserve it seems to make less moral sense, and our focus 
tends to shift towards preventing harm from occurring and away from inflicting 
suffering on the actor that caused the harm. But what if you and I were in the 
same position as Wilbur: unable to act except as the neurochemistry of our 
brains, which we are wholly unaware of, leads us to act? Would a moral and 
just legal system punish us—purely for vengeance’s sake—for something be-
yond our control? 
This Note explores the relationship between the concept of free will, our 
ever-growing science of the mind, and the law. Part I discusses the concept of 
free will and argues that a scientific understanding of human behavior conflicts 
with the majority’s view of free will. Part II examines the role the popular con-
ception of free will has played in our legal structure, focusing on notions of 
blame, moral responsibility, and retribution, and argues that we must dispense 
with retribution as a theory of punishment. Part III addresses common concerns 
with this proposal, and argues that our criminal justice system need not undergo 
any substantial changes to reflect a modern understanding of human behavior. 
I. DO YOU CHOOSE TO THINK WHAT YOU THINK? 
A. The Definition of Free Will 
Free will has been a subject of debate for over two millennia.11 As a result, 
the philosophical arguments on this subject are nuanced and have generated an 
                                                                                                                                
believed that demons exercised free will in taking control of animals, this diminished belief 
in demonic possession coincides with the belief that animals do not operate freely. 
8  Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 
179, 217 (1998). 
9  Emad H. Atiq, How Folk Beliefs About Free Will Influence Sentencing: A New Target for 
the Neuro-Determinist Critics of Criminal Law, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 475 (2013); Luis 
E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1410 (2011); Melissa 
Burkley, Is Free Will a Magic Trick?, HUFF POST TED WEEKENDS (Feb. 19,  
2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-burkley-phd/is-free-will-a-mag 
ic-tric_b_4467625.html; see infra Part I.A (discussing the definition of free will). 
10  Jerry A. Coyne, You Don’t Have Free Will, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Jerry-A-Coyne/131165/. 
11  Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 29, 2010), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/freewill/. 
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immense amount of scholarly work.12 Thus, when the subject arises, several 
different interpretations of “free will” may come to mind.13 For example, some 
identify free will with freedom of action; we have free will as long as we are 
not coerced or restrained from acting in accord with our own desires (even if 
we do not choose those desires).14 Thus, if we want to go to the gym, and noth-
ing is stopping us from going (or forcing us to go) to the gym, then our going to 
the gym is proof positive of free will.15  
However, this definition ignores the principal reason why the notion of free 
will is so widely accepted: most of us feel that “we are the conscious source of 
our thoughts and actions.”16 Not only can we act in accord with our will, but it 
seems like we are able to will what we will.17 That is to say, we do not feel as if 
all our desires and actions are determined by prior causes and events. Not only 
are we aware of our desires, we feel like we are consciously controlling our de-
sires. It also seems like we choose whether to act in accord with our desires. 
For example, if we deliberate on whether to go to the gym, and reasons come to 
mind that lead us towards one decision over the other, it feels like we are in 
complete control of our thoughts: that we are choosing to bring our thoughts 
into existence, rather than simply witnessing their arrival for reasons beyond 
our control. As a result, it feels as if we have made a choice to deliberate on the 
matter, not that a choice has been made for us. 
Studies have shown that most people’s understanding of human action is 
significantly different from that revealed through cognitive science.18 For ex-
ample, one study had participants give reactions to two similar vignettes.19 In 
both scenarios, a device was continually delivering electric shocks to a rat in an 
experiment. There was also a power button that, if pressed, would stop the elec-
tric shocks to the rat. In the first scenario, a computer had a robotic hand that 
was positioned next to the button. The computer had the information that if it 
pressed the button, the shocks would stop. However, all of the computer’s 
software instructions and programming code directed it not to press the button. 
                                                        
12  See generally BOB DOYLE, FREE WILL: THE SCANDAL IN PHILOSOPHY (2011), available at 
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/books/Free_Will_Scandal.pdf (discussing the “his-
tory of the free will problem”). 
13  See generally id. (discussing the “taxonomy of free will positions”). 
14  This is the definition usually promulgated by compatibilists. Id. at 157; SAM HARRIS, 
FREE WILL 16 (2012). 
15  This example is modeled after an example given by Sam Harris. HARRIS, supra note 14. 
16  Id. at 16–17; see Atiq, supra note 9, at 450. 
17  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 39 n.16. This sentiment originally comes from 19th century 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. See ILHAM DILMAN, FREE WILL: AN HISTORICAL 
AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 165–66 (1999). Einstein also shared this sentiment with 
Schopenhauer. HARRIS, supra note 14, at 39 n.16. 
18  See Atiq, supra note 9, at 474–75 (citing multiple studies examining the commonsense 
“folk” notion of free will). 
19  Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, Free Will and the Bounds of the Self, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 550–51 (Robert Kane ed., 2011); see Atiq, supra note 9. 
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In the second scenario, the computer is swapped for a person. This person 
is also aware that if he presses the button, the electric shocks will cease. How-
ever, it is stipulated that all of the person’s “desires and urges—both conscious 
and unconscious” are not to press the button.20 
The participants were asked whether they agreed with the following two 
statements: (1) “Even though all of [the computer’s] software and programming 
code are not to [press the button], it is still possible that [the computer] will 
[press the button];” and (2) “Even though all of [the person’s] urges, desires, 
thoughts, etc., are not to [press the button], it is still possible that [the person] 
will [press the button].”21 The results were predictable—people generally disa-
greed with the former and agreed with the latter.22 
Whereas the scientific picture suggests that our actions are the result of de-
termined mental states and processes, the public’s understanding generally en-
tails “something more—a separate self that stands outside all these states and 
processes and can choose to ignore their promptings.”23 Thus, it appears that 
“the popular conception of free will consists of two assumptions: (1) that each 
of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are 
the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present.”24 
B. The Principal Philosophical Positions on Free Will 
This notion of free will embodies the philosophical position known as “lib-
ertarianism.”25 Libertarianism holds that human agency—that is, the capacity 
for human beings to make choices—is not bound to physical causality, and is 
therefore free and undetermined.26 In contrast with libertarianism, “determin-
ism” is the philosophical position that our decisions are controlled by back-
ground causes (prior events, prior conditions, and the laws of nature).27 Under a 
deterministic viewpoint, if you could rewind the “tape of your life” to the mo-
ment before you made a decision, the same outcome would occur because the 
same underlying causes would govern your behavior.28 Libertarianism and de-
terminism are referred to as “incompatibilist” views, as each holds that there is 
no way for the two to coexist.29 If our will is fully determined by a chain of 
                                                        
20  Knobe & Nichols, supra note 19, at 550. 
21  Id. at 550–51. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. at 551; Atiq, supra note 9.  
24  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 6. 
25  3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 745–46 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). It should 
be noted that philosophical libertarianism has no relation to political libertarianism. Joshua 
Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1776 (2004); HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15. 
26  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15–16. 
27  Carl Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal/. 
28  Coyne, supra note 10. 
29  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 15. 
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events leading back to our birth and beyond, the libertarian notion of free will 
is an illusion.30 “Compatibilists” do not operate using the libertarian definition 
of free will, but rather define free will as being synonymous with freedom of 
action.31 Under this definition, compatibilists believe that free will and deter-
minism are not mutually exclusive.32 While these are the general philosophical 
positions within the free will debate, each one of these positions has several 
subdivisions within it. 
FIGURE 1: “A TAXONOMY OF FREE WILL POSITIONS”33
As the non-exhaustive diagram above illustrates, philosophers have been hard 
at work discussing and labeling their different theories on the issue of free will. 
This Note will not discuss in detail the nuances among the various philosophi-
cal theories, but rather will focus on the popular conception of free will as de-
fined in Part I.A, as this is the problematic and commonly held notion of free 
will that so often influences our laws and legal structure.34 However, it is useful 
to note the general differences between determinism and compatibilism, as Jus-
tices on the U.S. Supreme Court have made similar arguments in other con-
texts.35 
                
30 Id. 
31 DOYLE, supra note 12, at 157. 
32 HARRIS, supra note 14; DOYLE, supra note 12, at 157. 
33 The diagram is adapted from Bob Doyle’s book, Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. 
DOYLE, supra note 12, at 63. 
34 This is for two primary reasons: (1) this note is not intended to be a comprehensive philo-
sophical article, and (2) for the sanity of most readers, whose minds grow numb with the ad-
dition of each philosophical term of art. 
35 See infra Part II.A. 
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C. The Objective Argument: Your Brain is the Boss 
The libertarian notion that one’s thoughts and actions are divorced from 
causal events, and that at any moment we are free to choose our behavior, has 
become an untenable philosophical argument. Aside from the lack of scientific 
evidence to support the notion,36 we now know that unconscious neural events 
inform our decision-making.37 If they did not, then changes to our brain’s 
chemistry would not have an effect upon our choices. However, it turns out that 
even small changes to our brain’s chemistry can have a drastic effect on our 
behavior.38 For example, when otherwise normal Parkinson’s patients were ex-
posed to a drug that caused an imbalance in dopamine levels, several of them 
became pathological gamblers.39 These patients engaged in their new addiction 
by spending an inordinate amount of money on online poker, and by flying to 
Las Vegas where one man lost over $200,000 gambling at various casinos.40 
In fact, everything about you—your personality, 
your desires, your sexual orientation, and so on—is the 
way it is because of the structure of your brain.41 Several 
examples from medical literature suggest that each of 
these traits is subject to change given the requisite chang-
es to your brain. One fascinating and well-known case is 
that of Phineas Gage, a healthy twenty-five-year-old rail-
road foreman who had a three-foot-seven-inch, thirteen-
pound metal rod pass through his head due to a rather un-
fortunate explosion that occurred while he was preparing 
to blast rock for a roadbed.42 Amazingly, Gage was con-
scious and able to speak within minutes of the accident, 
despite the fact that the rod had taken a sizable portion of 
his brain with it.43 Gage retained his cognitive faculties 
and lived for twelve years after the accident.44 However, 
Gage seemed to become another person entirely; he was 
much more obstinate, impatient, and capricious, and close 
friends stated he was “no longer Gage.”45 
                                                        
36  Atiq, supra note 9, at 450 n.1. 
37  HARRIS, supra note 14; David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC, Jul./Aug. 2011, 
at 112, 114. 
38  Eagleman, supra note 37, at 115. 
39  Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that affects our decision-making. Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at 114. This will be demonstrated through several examples. 
42  JOHN M. HARLOW, RECOVERY FROM THE PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH THE HEAD 4 
(1869). 
43  Id. at 5. 
44  Id. at 15–16; Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 47 
(2010). 
45  HARLOW, supra note 42, at 13–14; accord Erickson, supra note 44. 
FIGURE 2: PHINEAS 
GAGE’S SKULL AND 
THE IRON ROD 
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Another interesting example involves a forty-year-old husband who devel-
oped a sudden and overwhelming interest in child pornography.46 As this new 
sexual preference was developing, the man complained of worsening head-
aches.47 After being found guilty of child molestation charges, the man under-
went a brain scan that revealed a massive tumor in his orbitofrontal cortex (a 
section of the brain believed to be responsible for decision-making mecha-
nisms).48 The tumor was removed, and the man’s sexual appetite returned to 
normal.49 A year after his brain surgery, his pedophilic behavior returned, and 
doctors discovered that a portion of the brain tumor had been overlooked in the 
previous surgery.50 After neurosurgeons removed the remaining tumor, the 
man’s behavior once again returned to normal.51 There are also documented in-
stances of brain infections causing an individual’s sexual orientation to 
change.52 
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate that “human behavior cannot 
be separated from human biology.”53 Even your genes alone can provide in-
formation about the behaviors in which you are more or less likely to engage. 
In fact, just by knowing that you are genetically male (i.e., that you have a Y 
chromosome), we know that the probability you will commit a violent crime 
increases about 882 percent over that of a genetic female.54 The precise struc-
ture of your brain is what allows you to resist, or fail to resist, the next impulse 
that arises. If you resist the urge to order dessert after dinner, this display of 
“willpower” does not reveal any free choice. If your brain had been different in 
that exact moment, you would not have been able to resist the urge, and this 
would also have been through no choice of your own. If your brain were in yet 
another state, perhaps you would never have felt the urge to begin with. Is this 
something you would be able to take credit for? Have you chosen not to feel 
the urge to go gambling right now? 
Neuroscience now suggests that our brains make “decisions” before we be-
come consciously aware of them.55 Physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a 
                                                        
46  Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia 
Symptom and Constructional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 437 (2003); Ea-
gleman, supra note 37. 
47  Eagleman, supra note 37. 
48  Id.; see also Carmen Cavada & Wolfram Schultz, The Mysterious Orbitofrontal Cortex: 
Foreword, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 205 (2000) (summarizing the findings of studies on the 
functions of the orbitofrontal cortex). 
49  Eagleman, supra note 37. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  See Bruce L. Miller et al., Hypersexuality or Altered Sexual Preference Following Brain 
Injury, 49 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 867, 869–70 (1986). 
53  Eagleman, supra note 37 at 115. 
54  DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 158–59 (2011). 
55  See Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cer-
ebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 
106 BRAIN 623, 623 (1983). 
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notable experiment whereby subjects hooked to an EEG56 were asked to per-
form simple, voluntary motor acts (e.g., flex your fingers) at the time of their 
choosing, and to record the moment at which they became aware of their deci-
sion.57 His results showed that the brain had undergone processes indicating a 
decision to move some several hundred milliseconds before the subjects report-
ed the appearance of a conscious intention to perform the specific act.58 Inter-
estingly, Libet was not trying to disprove the existence of free will through his 
experiments. Rather, Libet believed that humans did have free will and that 
there was some action people could take that did not have any unconscious 
neural causal precursors.59 This experiment has also been conducted by meas-
uring brain activity with fMRI,60 and the results have shown that “the outcome 
of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex 
up to 10 [seconds] before it enters awareness.”61 
This research seems to leave little room for free will, as it opens up the 
possibility that someone else could theoretically know every choice you are go-
ing to make before you do.62 Neuroscientist and philosopher Sam Harris illus-
trates this with the example of a “perfect neuroimaging device.”63 A device that 
could perfectly detect even the subtlest changes in brain function would allow 
an experimenter to continually report what a subject was going to think and do 
throughout the day all while the subject still felt free to choose what he was go-
ing to do.64 Therefore, no matter how much it feels like we are consciously au-
thoring our thoughts and actions, it appears that our brain is the boss. 
                                                        
56  Electroencephalography (or EEG) is the “measurement of electrical potential differences 
across points on the scalp using sensitive equipment. These small potential differences are 
the result of electrical activity within the brain and are associated with brain function.” Learn 
More About tDCS / EEG, NEUROELECTRICS, http://www.neuroelectrics.com/software/ (last 
visited June 23, 2015). 
57  Libet et al., supra note 55, at 624–25. 
58  Id. at 635–36. 
59  Stanley Klein, Libet’s Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commen-
tary, 11 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 273, 276 (2002). 
60  Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (or fMRI) is a relatively new type of brain scan 
that observes “blood flow in the brain to detect areas of activity,” through the use of radio 
waves and strong magnetic fields. Stephanie Watson, How fMRI Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/fmri.htm (last visited May 13, 2015). 
61  Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human 
Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008). 
62  It should be noted that even if there were no gap in time between our brain’s activity and 
our subjective awareness of the impulse, a libertarian notion of free will would still not make 
philosophical or scientific sense, because we would still be unable to control when the im-
pulse arises and what the impulse entails. Thus, an argument against the popular conception 
of free will is by no means predicated on Libet’s experiments being scientifically sound. 
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 9. 
63  Id. at 10. 
64  Id. at 10–11. 
Spring 2015] FREE WILL IS NO BARGAIN 1001 
D. The Subjective Argument: Witnessing Your Experience 
This section encourages you, the reader, to reflect upon the nature of 
thought, and provides some thought experiments to guide you along the way. 
Although it feels like we control our thoughts, beliefs, and desires, some intro-
spection on this point can also reveal the cognitive illusion. Is your belief really 
subject to your will? Try this first experiment: take something you know to be 
true (perhaps the fact that George Washington was the first president of the 
United States), and see if you can genuinely change your belief.65 You will 
likely find yourself hostage to your belief.66 This should expose an important 
characteristic about your experience; you cannot change your mind, your mind 
can only change you.67 The fact is, some neural event—which you exercise no 
control over—is required for you to change your belief about Washington, and 
this neural event itself can only be brought about by prior events (neural and 
external) over which you also have no control. If you did have the freedom to 
change your beliefs in this way, negative emotions such as depression and sad-
ness would be much easier to overcome, as one could simply change his or her 
beliefs that were giving rise to the emotion in the first place.  
The truth of our circumstance is hidden in plain sight; thoughts simply ap-
pear in consciousness, and we cannot control which thoughts are promoted to 
consciousness.68 As Dr. Harris states, having this control would require that we 
“think [our thoughts], before we think them.”69 To illustrate this, try this 
thought experiment: among all of the cities you know of, select one, and ob-
serve what this conscious process is like.70 This should be as free a choice as 
one can make. After you have settled on one, disregard it, and think of another 
city. Once you have decided on a new city, reflect on what this process was like 
yet again. Were you free to choose any city you wanted? What about the cities 
you are aware of, but whose names did not occur to you to pick? Perhaps Lon-
don, Paris, and Tokyo came to mind, but perhaps Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Nash-
ville were not forthcoming. Did you choose not to have Tel Aviv arise in 
thought? “Were you free to choose that which did not occur to you to 
choose?”71 
If you pay close enough attention, you can notice that we no more control 
the inner workings of our brains than we do the functioning of our livers.72 Al-
though this may appear controversial, there are times where many would con-
                                                        
65  SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN VALUES 
139 (2010). 
66  Id. 
67  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 37–38. 
68  Skeptic Magazine, Sam Harris on “Free Will”, YOUTUBE, at 12:30 (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCofmZlC72g. 
69  Id. at 14:00. 
70  This example is from a lecture given by Dr. Harris. Id. at 19:05. 
71  Id. at 21:18. 
72  See Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1404. 
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cede this is so. Imagine the following situation: a twenty-five-year-old, up-
standing student (former Eagle Scout, former marine) kills thirteen people in a 
shooting rampage at his university’s campus.73 After the incident, the police 
discover a suicide note, where the killer has requested that an autopsy be per-
formed to see if his recent “overwhelming violent impulses” were the result of 
changes to his brain.74 During the subsequent autopsy, it is discovered that the 
student had developed a tumor that was pressing against his amygdala, which is 
a portion of the brain that regulates fear and aggression.75 There is little doubt 
that the tumor was a proximate cause of the student’s actions.  
This story may sound familiar to you; the student was Charles Whitman 
(the “Texas Tower Sniper”), and the incident occurred in 1966.76 The existence 
of Whitman’s brain tumor seems to absolve him of responsibility. He certainly 
did not choose to have a brain tumor, nor could he choose how the brain tumor 
impacted his behavior. He appears to have been profoundly unlucky; to be a 
mere “victim of biology.”77 However, a brain tumor is simply an easy way to 
identify why your thoughts and actions were as they were.78 If we could clearly 
identify why a murderer without a brain tumor acted as he did (perhaps his 
brain’s neurophysiology was such that he lacked empathy for others and had an 
irascible temperament), such a discovery would be as exculpatory as the brain 
tumor.79 While it is unfortunate for Whitman that he developed a brain tumor, 
he will at least be remembered in a sympathetic light due to the tumor; any 
criminal who behaves in a similarly abhorrent manner without such a salient 
sign of illness will be remembered as a monster, although equally “in control” 
of his thoughts and actions. 
Although we notice changes in our day-to-day experience, we are com-
pletely unaware of, and do not exercise control over, the neurophysiological 
events that produce those changes.80 Thus, thoughts arise in consciousness un-
authored, and we are unable to “choose” their contents or arrival. However, 
                                                        
73  Eagleman, supra note 37, at 112, 114. 
74  Id. at 114. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 112. 
77  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 53–54. 
78  Id. at 5. 
79  Id. 
80  HARRIS, supra note 65, at 103. I have avoided using labels to describe the philosophical 
position described throughout most of this article, as I fear such terms are more likely to turn 
off readers than to actually promote the transfer of ideas. However, for those who are inter-
ested, the position argued for in this article is most closely aligned with Hard Incompatibil-
ism. This article does not suggest that strict determinism is true, and that every possible 
event (including neural events) is necessarily predictable. Quantum indeterminacy may pro-
vide for some randomness on the molecular level, thereby interrupting a pure chain of cause 
and effect; however, the addition of any degree of randomness does not offer support for the 
popular conception of free will, as randomness still would not allow one to choose their 
thoughts or actions. 
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most people do not view this as the case. As a result, the libertarian attitude to-
wards human behavior continues to influence our legal system. 
II. FREE WILL AND THE LAW 
A. Legal Recognition of Free Will 
The notion of free will seems to touch upon many aspects of our lives. It is 
considered a central “tenet of Judeo-Christian morality” and the basis for hold-
ing people accountable for their actions.81 It also seems to bear upon “feelings 
of guilt and personal accomplishment,” and what P.F. Strawson calls “partici-
pant reactive attitudes.”82 Given its widespread acceptance and impression, it 
seems all but inevitable that the notion of free will has influenced our laws and 
legal structure in various ways. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed free will, stating that individuals 
have an “ability and duty . . . to choose between good and evil,” and that the 
recognition of human free will is “universal and persistent in mature systems of 
law.”83 The Court has even contrasted free will with a “deterministic view of 
human conduct that is inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal 
justice system.”84 Justice Scalia, the longest-serving current justice on the 
Court, has echoed the most common understanding of free will, stating: 
Besides being less likely to regard death as an utterly cataclysmic punish-
ment, the Christian is also more likely to regard punishment in general as de-
served. The doctrine of free will—the ability of man to resist temptations to evil, 
which God will not permit beyond man’s capacity to resist—is central to the 
Christian doctrine of salvation and damnation, heaven and hell. The post-
Freudian secularist, on the other hand, is more inclined to think that people are 
what their history and circumstances have made them, and there is little sense in 
assigning blame.85 
                                                        
81  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1410–11. 
82  HARRIS, supra note 14, at 1; see generally P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 
available at http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._F._Strawson_Freedom_&_Resentment.pdf 
(last visited May 13, 2015) (arguing that, regardless of whether people have free will, people 
would not give up feeling and describing their “participant reactive attitudes”). 
83  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)); see HARRIS, supra note 14, at 48. 
84  United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978); Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consisten-
cy: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005); 
HARRIS, supra note 14, at 48. However, some argue that the Court was referring to fatalism 
rather than philosophical determinism. See, e.g., Richard Carrier, Free Will in American 
Law: From Accidental Thievery to Battered Woman Syndrome, FREETHOUGHT BLOGS (Jul. 9, 
2013), http://freethoughtblogs.com/carrier/archives/4073. 
85  Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17, 19.; accord Jef-
frey L. Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression 
Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 709 (2004). 
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In fact, the Court has at times distinguished between alternative definitions 
of free will, although not explicitly. For example, in Colorado v. Connelly,86 
the Court addressed when an individual’s waiver of his Miranda rights is “in-
voluntary” under the Fifth Amendment. In this case, Francis Connelly walked 
up to a police officer, “stuck out his hands in front of him and asked to be ar-
rested.”87 When the officer asked why, Connelly confessed to a murder he had 
committed a year before.88 Connelly was “neatly dressed and did not appear to 
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.”89 The police repeatedly informed 
him of his Miranda rights (the right to remain silent, etc.).90 Connelly stated 
that he understood his rights, but that he wished to speak about the matter any-
way, as it had been weighing on his conscience.91 Unbeknownst to the police 
officers at the time, Connelly suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia.92 
Connelly believed that he was the reincarnation of Jesus, and that his father, 
God, was commanding him to confess his prior actions through voices in his 
head.93 Connelly had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons on five separate 
occasions before this incident, and was initially found incompetent to stand tri-
al.94 
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that confessions and waivers such as 
Connelly’s are not “voluntary” because they are not “the product of a rational 
intellect and a free will.”95 However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument and invoked a compatibilist definition of voluntariness, stating that po-
lice coercion was necessary to defeat voluntariness and that a “mere examina-
tion of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process in-
inquiry.”96 The Court specifically stated that “voluntariness” under the Fifth 
Amendment was “not [based] on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the 
word,” and that typical notions of free will were inappropriate in the Miranda 
waiver context.97 
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, arguing that the Court had ig-
nored “200 years of constitutional jurisprudence” by narrowly focusing on 
whether the police had engaged in coercive conduct.98 However, the important 
                                                        
86  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
87  William T. Pizzi, Colorado v. Connelly: What Really Happened, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
377, 381 (2009). 
88  Id.; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160. 
89  Pizzi, supra note 87. 
90  Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
93  Id. at 174–75. 
94  Id.. 
95  Id. at 162 (majority opinion). 
96  Id. at 164–65. 
97  Id. at 170. 
98  Id. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent cites many previous cases where the 
Court discussed whether a confession was a product of free will. Id. at 177 n.2. 
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point this case illustrates (with respect to this Note) is that the Justices did not 
disagree about what “free will” was, but rather disagreed about whether one’s 
freedom of will is of constitutional significance in determining whether a con-
fession was “voluntary.” Both the majority and dissenting opinion suggest that 
to have free will, you must have the ability to choose between alternatives. In-
deed, Justice Stevens stated that the majority’s argument was “incomprehensi-
ble” with regard to Connelly’s post-custodial statements, because it violated a 
simple syllogism: (1) Free will is synonymous with the ability to engage in a 
“free and deliberate choice;” (2) For a waiver to be voluntary, it must be the 
“product of a free and deliberate choice;” (3) Therefore, a waiver is not volun-
tary if it isn’t the “product of . . . the defendant’s ‘free will.’ ”99 
As the Supreme Court contrasts free will with its deterministic counterpart, 
speaks of free will in terms of “choos[ing] between good and evil,” and holds 
the criminal law as a means of punishing “abuses of free will,” it appears that 
the Supreme Court generally refers to the popular conception of free will when 
it uses the term, rather than any philosophically nuanced version of it.100 And 
while it is not always clear what other courts mean when they use the term 
“free will,” it appears that most of the time courts refer to the term as under-
stood by the majority of people (and as defined in this Note): “whether the de-
fendant could have done other than he did.”101 
Not only do courts often acknowledge and respect a traditional notion of 
free will, our laws are shaped in part by the public’s perception of free will. 
Our laws are animated by our beliefs about what is right and wrong. It seems 
natural to believe that “the paradigmatic case of wrongdoing is that of a free 
agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and freely 
choosing . . . to do wrong.”102 This intuition leads to the retributive impulse that 
people should “get what they deserve,” and causes politicians to act “tough-on-
crime” to gain popular support.103 Moreover, while we condemn behavior we 
see as freely chosen, we excuse behavior we see as beyond the actor’s control. 
And as our views change as to what actions are freely chosen, the law tends to 
change with it. 
For example, according to a recent Gallup poll, 47 percent of Americans 
see homosexuality as something you are “born with,” compared to 33 percent 
                                                        
99  Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
100  See Cotton, supra note 84. On an arguably related side note, every justice that has served 
on the United States Supreme Court has been religious, with the possible exception of David 
Davis. See Religious Affiliation of the U.S. Supreme Court, ADHERENTS.COM, 
http://www.adherents.com/adh_sc.html (last visited May 13, 2015); Bob Ritter, Does a Su-
preme Court Justice’s Religion Matter?, HUMANIST NETWORK NEWS (May 19,  
2010), http://americanhumanist.org/HNN/issue/details/2010-05-does-a-supreme-court-jus 
tices-religion-matter. 
101  Cotton, supra note 84, at 1 n.1; see supra Part I.A. 
102  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415 (internal quotations omitted). 
103  Kirchmeier, supra note 85, at 704, 725 n.334. 
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who believe homosexuality is caused by “external factors.”104 Thirty-seven 
years  ago,  these  numbers  were  13  percent  and  56  percent  respectively.105 
FIGURE 3: GALLUP POLLING DATA ON VIEWS OF GAY/LESBIAN ORIENTATION106 
It is hard not to notice that being “born that way” is another way of saying that 
one’s sexual orientation is beyond his or her control, whereas attributing one’s 
sexual orientation to “external factors” is a way of identifying some degree of 
control or choice.107 Not surprisingly, as more Americans view homosexuality 
as an immutable trait rather than a choice, they have correspondingly become 
more accepting of homosexual relations108 and more accepting of same-sex 
marriage.109 At least in part due to this societal change in perspective, thirty-
seven states now have legal same-sex marriage, twenty-one of which have at-
tained this status in either 2014 or 2015.110 
                
104 Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans See Gay, Lesbian Orientation as Birth Factor, 




107 In a viral video, heterosexuals were asked whether they thought people chose to be gay. 
The common response was that homosexuality is a mixture of both nature and nurture, a 
choice that was largely informed by their upbringing and environment. However, when 
asked if they chose to be straight, they all answered in the negative; this revelation would in 
turn change many of their initial answers to reflect that people also do not choose to be ho-
mosexual. Radley Balko, ‘When Did You Choose To Be Straight’ Video Asks Heteros  
What Gay People Are Often Asked, HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/10/choose-to-be-straight-video-_n_3247301.html. 
108 Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New Normal, GALLUP 
(May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/Acceptance-Gay-Lesbian-Rela 
tions-New-Normal.aspx. 
109 Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in U.S., GALLUP 
(May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-solidifies-a 
bove.aspx. 
110 37 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 13 States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 
PROCON.ORG (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://gaymarriage.procon.org
/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857. These thirty-seven states are Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
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The subject of addiction also illustrates the influence a notion of free will 
has had on our laws. Indeed, “courts are now universally unwilling to criminal-
ize the mere status or condition of being currently addicted to an illegal drug” 
due to “assumptions of free will and responsibility.”111 Suffering from an ad-
diction is tantamount to suffering from the common cold—both are illnesses 
over which the victim has no control.112 Thus, the addict’s drug dependency 
should not be viewed as a moral failing, but rather as a medical condition re-
quiring treatment.113 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that criminalizing the 
“status” of being an addict would be equivalent to criminalizing someone for 
being “mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease,” laws 
which would “doubtless[ly] be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”114 Even proponents of free will are likely to concede limitations to the 
will’s power: one does not choose to be mentally ill, and thus is not responsible 
for being mentally ill. Likewise, the mentally ill are unable simply to choose to 
be mentally competent, just as a blind person cannot choose to have sight. 
However, some people remain skeptical about the disease model of addiction, 
viewing addicts as people who could have acted otherwise but instead chose to 
act poorly.115 Whether the addict is portrayed as a victim suffering from an ill-
ness or as a person who simply makes poor choices cannot help but influence 
our laws, because it changes the problem society is dealing with. If crime were 
viewed as a sign of underlying brain pathology, the focus shifts to helping the 
afflicted and preventing future harm, rather than on determining punishment 
based on the wrongful conduct.116 
Most of us feel that “people evaluate their environments, make choices, 
and impose those choices to the best of their ability on the world.”117 As a re-
sult, we tend to criminalize conduct and punish behavior that we view as freely 
chosen. There is a significant and clear nexus between the popular conception 
of free will and our willingness to hold an actor morally responsible for his 
                                                                                                                                
zona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Given the rapid change over the last couple of years, this list 
is likely to be inaccurate shortly after this note is published. Id. 
111  R. George Wright, Criminal Law and Sentencing: What Goes with Free Will?, 5 DREXEL 
L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
112  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
113  Chris Wright, Do Addicts Have Free Will, ALTERNET (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.alternet.org/do-addicts-have-free-will. 
114  Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
115  Join Together Staff, Choice and Free Will: Beyond the Disease Model of  
Addiction, PARTNERSHIP (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.drugfree.org/join-together/addiction 
/choice-and-free-will-beyond. 
116  Erickson, supra note 44, at 61–62. 
117  Id. at 56. 
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conduct.118 When society recognizes that someone lacks the free will necessary 
to choose between alternatives, we tend not to hold them as legally culpable 
agents.119 As a result, “[d]rug and alcohol addicts argue that their addictions 
rendered them unable to exercise free choice; defendants claim that they were 
neurologically incapable of premeditating their crimes; serotonin levels are 
submitted as evidence of impaired impulse control.”120 In fact, it is likely that 
the number of judicial opinions drawing from neuroscience has more than dou-
bled since 2005, with one study revealing more than 1,500 appellate judicial 
opinions wherein the judge “mentioned neurological or behavioral genetics ev-
idence that had been used as part of a defense in a criminal case.”121 Thus, the 
game has become “how much can we blame you for your conduct?” 
B. The Blame Game 
The popular conception of free will is “embedded in the very fabric of our 
system of criminal justice.”122 It can influence the elements of a crime, the de-
fenses that can be raised, and the sentence one can receive. The role free will, 
or “free choice,” plays is not subtle either. It is generally recognized that three 
conditions must be satisfied in order to view an individual as blameworthy, and 
thus responsible, for his or her conduct: “(1) the actor understood what she was 
doing; (2) the actor understood that what she was doing was wrong; and (3) the 
actor could have acted otherwise.”123 Free will is regarded as a central feature 
and integral component of the retributive conception of culpability.124 The legal 
arithmetic is straightforward. If your conduct was not the product of free will, 
you cannot be blamed for it. And if you cannot be blamed for your conduct, 
then you are relieved of responsibility.125 
The commonly held notion of free will plays a part in almost every element 
of a crime: the actus reus, or wrongful act, where the Model Penal Code126 re-
                                                        
118  See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of the Model Pe-
nal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 231–
32 (2004). 
119  Erickson, supra note 44, at 55–56. 
120  Kate Becker, Neuroscience, Free Will, and the Law, INSIDE NOVA (Feb. 19, 2012), http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20120426193545/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/insidenova/2012/02 
/neuroscience-free-will-and-the-law.html; see, e.g., Hill v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 187, 201–02 
(4th Cir. 2003) (defendant argued that his aggressive impulses arose from a serotonin defi-
ciency due to his genetics); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(defendant argued that he was compelled to use narcotics due to his addiction). 
121  Gary Stix, My Brain Made Me Pull the Trigger, SCI. AM. MIND, May/June 2014, at 14, 
14; Becker, supra note 120. 
122  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1406. 
123  Covey, supra note 118. 
124  Id. at 230–31. 
125  Id. 
126  The Model Penal Code is instructive when considering the impression free will has on 
our criminal law. This is because of the differences in criminal law from state to state. The 
Model Penal Code was an attempt by the American Law Institute (a “non-governmental or-
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quires the act to be voluntary or the “product of the effort or determination of 
the actor;”127 the mens rea, or guilty mind, where the Model Penal Code draws 
distinctions between levels of culpability;128 and the determination of proxi-
mate cause, where one’s freely willed act may be seen as a superseding cause 
of a crime (e.g., when the freely willed act of suicide relieves another of liabil-
ity who provided that person with the means to commit suicide).129 It also in-
forms the basic excuses within substantive criminal law, such as duress, infan-
cy, insanity, mistake, and provocation.130 However, free will’s influence over 
each of these different aspects of the criminal law boils down to one simple 
concern: are you morally responsible for your conduct? 
For an individual to be subject to criminal punishment, he or she must have 
committed a voluntary act. Some believe that the voluntary act principle re-
flects the “deeply held belief that it is unfair to punish someone for engaging in 
acts that are not the product of a free will.”131 However, not only does the defi-
nition of “voluntary” change depending on the legal issue at hand (e.g., volun-
tary act principle vs. voluntary waiver of Miranda rights); it also changes de-
pending on the court with specific regard to the voluntary act principle.132 For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has addressed the voluntary act principle, stating: 
A voluntary act is one in which the individual has the ability to choose his 
course of conduct. The only question is whether the person could have refrained 
from doing it, or whether he was controlled by some irresistible power. If he 
could have refrained, the act is voluntary; but, if he was impelled by some irre-
sistible force, it is involuntary.133 
Although this may seem like an action must be a product of free will in or-
der to be voluntary, that is not necessarily the case. The Model Penal Code 
states that a “bodily movement that . . . is not a product of the effort or determi-
nation of the actor, either conscious or habitual,” is not a voluntary act.134 
                                                                                                                                
ganization of highly regarded judges, lawyers, and law professors”) to draft a code that states 
might use in drafting their own respective criminal codes. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk 
Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code (Mar. 12, 1999), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. Although there are parts of 
the Model Penal Code that states have yet to adopt, it is, “more than any other code, . . . the 
closest thing to being an American criminal code.” Id. at 1. 
127  ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. 2009). 
128  Id. at 107–08. 
129  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1413–14. 
130  Covey, supra note 118, at 231; Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1406. 
131  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1412. 
132  See State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Ariz. 1995) (“We acknowledge that the word 
‘voluntary’ has been used in two separate senses, and this contributes to the confusion that 
surrounds the issue.”). 
133  United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In this case, the court was addressing an instance where someone drove while intoxicat-
ed. The individual argued that the operation of the motor vehicle was not voluntary because 
he became so drunk that he “[lost] the power to control his action.” The court rejected this 
argument. Id. 
134  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, even if a person suffers from a brain impairment that reduces his 
ability to exercise judgment (which may lead one to question whether that per-
son has “free will”), his action may still be voluntary under the voluntary act 
principle if he was relentless in pursuing his objective, demonstrating effort and 
determination.135 
If viewed as a corollary of free will, the voluntary act principle explains 
why people are held liable for what they do, rather than who they are (e.g., ac-
quiring or using a drug rather than being an addict, or engaging in homosexual 
conduct rather than being homosexual).136 This tracks our ability to attribute 
blame; while you may not be able to choose your sexual orientation (and thus, 
we cannot blame/punish you for it), it seems like you are able to choose to en-
gage in certain conduct (and therefore, we feel justified in blaming/punishing 
you). The D.C. Circuit phrased it thusly: 
[C]riminal responsibility is assessed only when through “free will” a man elects 
to do evil, and if he is not a free agent, or is unable to choose or to act voluntari-
ly, or to avoid the conduct which constitutes the crime, he is outside the postu-
late of the law of punishment.137 
The voluntary act requirement protects behavior that we generally view as 
not the product of effort or determination: reflexes or convulsions, conduct oc-
curring during hypnosis, and movements during unconsciousness or sleep.138 In 
fact, several individuals have been acquitted of homicide because they commit-
ted the act while sleepwalking, and thus did not act voluntarily.139 Although 
many view this as protecting behavior that is not freely chosen, as one does not 
choose his actions while unconscious, the current standard for what constitutes 
a “voluntary act” makes legal and practical sense even without harboring a no-
tion of free will. 
In most circumstances, an individual must have the requisite mindset along 
with the voluntary act in order to be found guilty of a crime.140 However, the 
crime you commit, and the punishment you receive, may change depending on 
the mindset with which you committed the act, despite the fact that the damage 
done may be the same in each case.141 Part of the reason we punish people 
                                                        
135  Lara, 902 P.2d at 1338–39. Arizona’s statutory definition of voluntary act in this case is 
comparable to the Model Penal Code’s definition. 
136  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1411. Of course, while sodomy laws do not violate the voluntary 
act principle, they suffer from other constitutional issues. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (striking down sodomy laws on due process grounds). 
137  United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting dissenting Judge 
Wright on his exposition of “established principles”). 
138  PODGOR ET AL., supra note 127. 
139  See generally Beth E. Teacher, Sleepwalking Used as a Defense in Criminal Cases and 
the Evolution of the Ambien Defense, 1 DUQ. CRIM. L.J. 127 (2010) (detailing the history of 
the sleepwalking defense in criminal cases). 
140  See Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1414. 
141  For example, the difference in mens rea accounts for the differences between first-degree 
murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. In 
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based on their level of intent is because we attribute blame to them in accord-
ance with their level of intent.142 Intentional acts appear more blameworthy, as 
they are more representative of your state of mind, and thus seem to appear 
more as the result of clear, conscious choice.143 If our criminal law is “based 
upon a theory of punishing the vicious will,” it seems only natural to punish ac-
tions that are freely chosen more severely than those that arise by accident.144 
Many defenses also touch upon a notion of free will. For example, the in-
sanity defense is considered to “reflect[] the fundamental moral principles of 
our criminal law.”145 A determination of guilt is not only a legal judgment that 
the defendant “pulled a trigger, took a bicycle, or sold heroin,” but also a “mor-
al judgment that the [defendant] is blameworthy.”146 Although the exact re-
quirements for an insanity defense differ depending on the jurisdiction,147 in 
each case the defense is allowed “not because the act was justified, but because 
society cannot blame the offender for his conduct.”148 Justice Breyer has stated 
that while insanity may not show the absence of mens rea, it does reveal the ab-
sence of a “vicious will.”149 
The most popular test for evaluating whether a defendant was insane is the 
M’Naghten test.150 This test arose in 1843, when Daniel M’Naghten shot and 
killed Edward Drummond in an attempt to assassinate England’s Prime Minis-
ter, Sir Robert Peel.151 Under the test, an accused is not criminally responsible 
for his actions if he was, at the time of the incident, suffering from a mental 
disease or defect of reason that prevented him from appreciating the nature, 
                                                                                                                                
each crime, the result is the unlawful killing of a human being. PODGOR ET AL., supra note 
127, at 275–76. 
142  Chiesa, supra note 9, at 1415. 
143  However, blameworthiness does not necessarily have to scale with level of intent. For 
example, some argue that a person guilty of premeditated murder may be less culpable than 
one without premeditation. See Michael Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psycho-
logical Evidence: Finding Coherence in the Criminal Law?, 14 NEV. L.J. 897, 901–02 
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quality, or wrongfulness of the act.152 When an individual lacks the capacity to 
distinguish between right and wrong actions, his ability to make “choices be-
tween alternative courses of action” is diminished and his reasoning is im-
paired.153 Punishing an individual who lacks the capacity to reason appears to 
be “as undignified and unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an ani-
mal.”154 
With respect to insanity defenses generally, the D.C. Circuit has stated, 
“[a] man who cannot reason cannot be subject to blame. Our collective con-
science does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.”155 Thus, 
when an individual is unable to choose his course of action—when he lacks 
free will—we tend not to attribute moral responsibility or blame to him. Indeed, 
many acknowledge that our criminal law revolves around the precept that “per-
sons can be held responsible for their actions because they have freely chosen 
them, rather than had them determined by forces beyond their control.”156 
Necessity and duress defenses also draw upon the popular conception of 
free will. Generally, an individual acts under duress if he is coerced to act “by 
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of 
another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been 
unable to resist.”157 In such a situation, the individual’s conduct, although made 
voluntarily and intentionally, does not reveal “any semblance of a meaningful 
choice.”158 An individual acts out of necessity when he or she is confronted 
with a choice of two evils: committing a crime, or engaging in some other be-
havior that “constitutes a greater evil.”159 The Ninth Circuit contrasted necessi-
ty with duress thusly: “The theory of necessity is that the defendant’s free will 
was properly exercised to achieve the greater good and not that his free will 
was overcome by an outside force as with duress.”160 
Although the aforementioned defenses play an important role in the guilt 
phase of a criminal trial, there are free-will-based corollaries within the penalty 
phase as well. Sentencing in capital cases requires the sentencer to consider a 
list of mitigating factors.161 The following are all common mitigating factors 
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that can render a defendant less culpable than otherwise (and the list is not ex-
haustive): the defendant’s age, brain damage, childhood abuse, drug addiction, 
extreme mental or emotional disturbances, intoxication, substantially impaired 
capacity, and mental retardation.162 Why do these factors warrant a less severe 
punishment? They all tend to show that the defendant’s behavior was not freely 
chosen, but rather was controlled by prior causes.163 Indeed, all of the factors 
listed “relate to the development of the defendant’s brain and the idea that neu-
rological or psychological problems show that the defendant is not as responsi-
ble as someone acting under ‘normal’ conditions.”164 
Our criminal law is largely focused on whether, and to what degree, some-
one is responsible for his or her conduct. We have created many doctrines in 
attempting to find the answer, from the general elements composing a crime to 
the excuses available to criminals. Although most of these doctrines have some 
utility beyond evaluating responsibility (e.g., regardless of how responsible you 
are, acting under duress or out of necessity may show you to be less dangerous 
than otherwise), some aspects of our criminal justice system would have to be 
jettisoned or reformed, such as the theory of retribution. 
C. Retribution and Legal Punishments 
There are generally two ways to classify justifications for legal punish-
ment: consequentialist justifications and retributivist justifications.165 As the 
name suggests, consequentialist justifications determine the value of a punish-
ment from its consequences.166 The principal consequentialist theories of pun-
ishment include the following: rehabilitation, which attempts to reform the of-
fender so he will not commit future crimes; isolation, which requires 
incapacitating the offender so he cannot commit crimes during the term of his 
imprisonment; and deterrence, which attempts to discourage either the offender 
or others in society from committing future crimes.167 If a consequentialist the-
ory of punishment inflicts suffering upon the offender, it is not because such 
suffering is justified in and of itself, but rather that such suffering leads to some 
positive result.168 
Conversely, retribution is the belief that “desert is a sufficient condition for 
punishment.”169 In other words, punishing an offender is justified simply be-
cause the offender deserves it, regardless of the actual consequences that result 
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from the punishment.170 In this sense, punishment is not a means to any posi-
tive result, but is an end in itself.171 I submit the following motto for retributiv-
ism: All else being equal, it is intrinsically better that the wrongdoer suffers 
than flourishes.172 Retribution was likely the first articulated justification for 
legal punishment, having been “borne out of the harsh and rigid justice of the 
Old Testament.”173 In fact, retribution as a legal punishment has been traced all 
the way back to the Code of Hammurabi, a Babylonian law code that predates 
even the earliest writings of the Bible.174 
Although the theory of retribution may seem antiquated or of little signifi-
cance in modern-day sentencing, this is not the case. It is true that consequen-
tialist justifications for punishment appeared to be the central goal of the crimi-
nal justice system during much of the twentieth century.175 In 1949, the U.S. 
Supreme Court even stated that “[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objec-
tive of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have be-
come important goals.”176 However, critics and proponents of retributivism 
alike agree that it has enjoyed a striking and vigorous comeback since the early 
1970s.177 Indeed, philosophers and legal scholars generally recognize retribu-
tion as the dominant theory of punishment, calling it “the leading philosophical 
justification for the institution of criminal punishment,”178 and “the criminal 
law’s central objective.”179 
So what does retribution have to do with free will? While retributivists typ-
ically do not argue for an “eye-for-an-eye” formulation of retribution,180 they 
do hold to the maxim that one should be punished in accord with his desert.181 
This leads to an important question: when does someone deserve to be pun-
ished for his or her conduct? The answer relies on the popular conception of 
free will: “A person deserves to suffer for doing ‘X’ if, and only if, it is fair to 
blame him for having done ‘X.’ ”182 Another question arises: when is it fair to 
blame someone for his or her behavior? Recall that if someone lacks free 
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will—that is, if he or she lacks the ability to choose to act differently—we typi-
cally feel as if his or her conduct is not blameworthy (e.g., the insane, animals, 
inanimate objects or events).183 Thus, without free will, retributive justifications 
for punishment lose any footing, as there is no basis on which to blame people 
for their actions and no sense in which one deserves to be punished.184 
This will likely appear to be an absurd, or at least unappealing, conclusion 
to most readers. After all, seeking vengeance against a wrongdoer seems to lie 
at the core of our sense of justice,185 and retribution has its roots in “vengeance, 
bloodlust, revenge, retaliation, and an eye for an eye.”186 This reaction is under-
standable, partly due to just how deep the desire for retribution can run. Take 
Ariel Castro for example, who kidnapped three women and held them captive 
in his Cleveland home for nearly a decade, during which time he repeatedly 
raped them and fathered a child with one.187 The women were discovered on 
May 6, 2013, when one of Castro’s neighbors heard them screaming from in-
side the home.188 Castro claimed that he was addicted to sex and was unable to 
control his impulses.189 He pled guilty to hundreds of charges, and was sen-
tenced to life in prison plus one thousand years.190 About a month into his sen-
tence, Castro hanged himself in his prison cell.191 
The public’s reaction to this news was telling, if not shocking. Understand-
ably, many viewed Castro as a monster and believed he deserved to be pun-
ished for his heinous crimes.192 However, many people wanted more than jus-
tice in the legal arena; they wanted Castro to languish in prison for decades so 
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he could experience as much mental and physical suffering as possible.193 Here 
are some of the common reactions to Castro’s suicide from a popular forum 
discussing the news (spelling and grammar in its original form): “Its great hes 
dead, but it would be better if he was forced to live out the rest of his miserable 
life in that hole;” “He took the easy way out. Scumbags like him don’t deserve 
such simple exits;” “[O]n one hand I wish he’s alive to suffer as much as possi-
ble, but on the other hand I don’t want to waste our money on scums like him;” 
“I would have gladly paid to keep a piece of shit like Castro in jail and suffer-
ing.”194 
This is not to suggest that vengeance is synonymous with retribution.195 
However, it is clear that both are motivated by a desire to see the offender suf-
fer.196 The reactions to Castro’s suicide illustrate precisely why retribution is 
such a strong force in our society. When someone commits a heinous crime, we 
instinctively feel the need to blame him for his conduct; we feel he deserves to 
suffer for his crime; and we are almost guaranteed to fail to see the true causes 
of human behavior. 
D. The Precarious Punishment of Retribution in Action 
The contrast between our disdain for someone like Ariel Castro and our 
sympathy for someone who commits a crime while apparently lacking free will 
(e.g., the insane) is the result of a moral illusion that underlies our retributive 
impulses. Of course, this is not the first time someone has argued against re-
tributive punishments on philosophical grounds, and any argument would be 
remiss to not mention perhaps the most famous case where the issue was 
raised: the 1924 case of Leopold and Loeb.197 The nation’s press described the 
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case as the “Crime of the Century!” Eighteen-year-old Richard Loeb and nine-
teen-year-old Nathan Leopold had kidnapped fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks, 
murdered him, and held him for ransom on the pretense he was still alive.198 
The significance of the case arises from the backgrounds of the two defendants 
and the defense put on by none other than Clarence Darrow, arguably the most 
famous trial lawyer in America at the time.199 
Leopold and Loeb both appeared to have impeccable and fortunate back-
grounds. Although in their teens, both had already attained undergraduate de-
grees and were set to attend law school.200 In fact, Leopold was considered a 
child prodigy with an IQ of 210, and Loeb graduated college at an age where 
most were juniors in high school.201 They were also the descendants of two of 
Chicago’s wealthiest families: Leopold’s father was in charge of a box manu-
facturing business, and Loeb’s father was a lawyer who went on to become the 
vice president of the department store company Sears and Roebuck.202 Given 
their upstanding backgrounds, and their obvious lack of need for money, inves-
tigators likely doubted that these two could be the perpetrators of the crime.203 
As it turns out, they were what many might classically think of as evil; the 
two friends and lovers had spent six months carefully planning “the perfect 
murder.”204 Why? “[F]or the experience.”205 It was what many would call a 
“thrill kill”; they had murdered a boy just to see what it felt like.206 At trial, 
there was no doubt they had committed the crime, as they had repeatedly con-
fessed to the act.207 Indeed, if there were ever two men who deserved to be pun-
ished for their behavior, this appeared to be the case. They had no noble motive 
which would mitigate their blame. They showed no remorse for their actions, 
and even appeared to be proud of them. They were not insane (a sentiment even 
Darrow shared). They did not have brain tumors or any other salient physical 
ailment many might perceive as foreclosing their ability to exercise free will. 
And to top it off, virtually all of the public and press were against them.208 As 
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renowned English jurist William Blackstone stated, “punishments are . . . only 
inflicted for abuse of that free will, which God has given to man,” and this ap-
peared to be a simple case where two young men had chosen to abuse their free 
will.209 
Darrow’s goal was to have the boys sentenced to imprisonment rather than 
death.210 In his efforts, Darrow delivered a twelve-hour plea that is regarded by 
many as “one of the most remarkable legal arguments in the history of advoca-
cy,”211 and that reportedly even brought the judge to tears.212 Darrow’s argu-
ments reflected a deterministic view of human behavior.213 In essence, he ar-
gued that Leopold and Loeb could not be blamed for their childhood 
development, and that they had “diseased or abnormal makeups” due to heredi-
tary and environmental factors that were entirely beyond their control.214 Here 
is an excerpt from Darrow’s final arguments: 
What had this boy to do with it? He was not his own father; he was not his 
own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of this was handed to him. 
He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth. He did not make him-
self. And yet he is to be compelled to pay.  
There was a time in England . . . when judges used to . . . call juries to try a 
horse, a dog, a pig, for crime. . . . Animals were tried. Do you mean to tell me 
that Dickie Loeb had any more to do with his making than any other product of 
heredity that is born upon the earth?215 
In the end, Darrow succeeded, and Leopold and Loeb were sentenced to life in 
prison plus ninety-nine years.216 
Darrow’s reasoning has been echoed many times since then. One recent 
example occurred on June 15, 2013, when sixteen-year-old Ethan Couch 
drunkenly drove into several people standing by the side of a road with his Ford 
F-350 pickup truck, killing four and injuring others.217 On December 10 of that 
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same year, Ethan was sentenced to ten years of probation for his actions.218 
How was Ethan able to avoid imprisonment for his crime? It just so happens, 
Ethan suffered from “affluenza,” or so his lawyers claimed.219 The defense’s 
argument took the following form: Ethan was a spoiled child whose wealthy 
parents gave him everything he wanted (e.g., motorcycles, cars, money, etc.) 
and never taught him that “sometimes you don’t get your way.”220 Because 
Ethan had been raised to believe he could always do what he wanted, he had 
grown up “emotionally flat.” Therefore, he could not be responsible for behav-
ior that resulted from his stunted upbringing.221 While it is not clear that the 
judge bought the argument hook, line, and sinker, the sentence suggests that the 
argument was effective.222 
If someone is not responsible for his or her actions, a harsh retributive pun-
ishment seems inappropriate. However, since notions of moral responsibility 
and blame rest on a cognitive illusion, we will continually be struggling to 
identify when someone is or is not responsible for his behavior.223 The unfortu-
nate case of Patricia (“Patty”) Hearst is demonstrative. 
In 1974, nineteen-year-old Patty Hearst, the granddaughter of newspaper 
magnate William Randolph Hearst, was kidnapped in the middle of the night 
from her apartment, forced into the trunk of a car, and imprisoned in a closet 
for fifty-seven days where she was blindfolded and repeatedly raped and tor-
tured.224 Her captors were members of the Symbionese Liberation Army 
(“SLA”), a radical left-wing organization determined to enact a proletarian rev-
olution that would bring down the “capitalist state.”225 The SLA hoped to bring 
media attention to the group to help facilitate its goals.226 While in captivity, 
the SLA attempted to “brainwash” Patty by subjecting her to “an unrelenting 
campaign of mental cruelty, sensory deprivation, malnutrition, threats of death 
and injury, and the constant confusion of affection and abuse.”227 Their efforts 
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paid off: Patty Hearst, reborn as “Tania,” joined the SLA in committing several 
crimes, most notably a bank robbery in San Francisco.228 She even stated in 
taped messages that she had willingly given up her previous lifestyle, that she 
had not been “brainwashed, drugged, torture[d], hypnotized, or in any way con-
fused,” and that she was committed to fighting alongside her captors.229 The 
police found her in an apartment in San Francisco on September 18, 1975, and 
charged her with robbery, kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, and as-
sault with intent to commit murder.230 
The case seemed to revolve around one question: did Patty Hearst freely 
choose to join the SLA and participate in the crimes (an exercise of free will 
that would render her blameworthy, and thus deserving of punishment), or was 
she forced to participate due to either duress or indoctrination (circumstances 
that would have impaired her free will, and thus relieved her of responsibil-
ity)?231 In confronting this question, one of the government’s expert witnesses 
stated, “I think she entered that bank voluntarily in order to participate in the 
robbing of that bank. This was an act of her own free will.”232 The jury agreed 
and found her guilty.233 The judge, in rejecting the argument that her unfortu-
nate circumstance should serve as a mitigating factor, sentenced her to seven 
years of imprisonment.234 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.235 
The public’s attitude towards Patty Hearst is fascinating. Initially, most 
people strongly detested Patty Hearst, considering her a “spoiled brat” that 
might get off the hook because she was the wealthy heiress of a famous family 
(a sentiment oddly similar to that expressed towards Ethan today).236 In fact, 
polling data reveals that in 1975, about 90 percent of the general public be-
lieved she was responsible for her actions and that she should be sentenced to 
prison.237 However, over the course of several years, the public grew sympa-
thetic, developing a “widespread visceral sense that a young, impressionable 
girl who was unduly influenced by her kidnappers is somehow not entirely re-
sponsible for her acts.”238 Eventually, President Carter commuted her sentence, 
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stating that Patty had only joined the SLA because of the horrific personal ex-
periences she had endured, and thus she did not deserve her punishment.239 In 
2001, President Clinton granted her a full pardon.240 
These cases illustrate one of the major problems with retribution: it con-
centrates a court’s attention on unfounded and confused metaphysical notions 
of desert and blame (i.e., issues like who is blameworthy, how blameworthy are 
they, how responsible were they for their conduct, etc.), rather than on how best 
to protect everyone from future harm. Imagine that we had the knowledge and 
tools to help someone like Leopold or Loeb. What if there was an hour-long 
procedure they could undergo that would completely restore their sense of em-
pathy and compassion for other human beings to the degree of that of a normal 
person? Would it make any moral sense to kill them or jail them for life when 
this procedure exists?241 Or what about Whitman? Had he not committed sui-
cide and his brain tumor was discovered, would he have deserved to suffer with 
his brain tumor for the remainder of his life?242 Or imagine an extreme version 
of the Patty Hearst case: if I were able to take full control of your mind and 
force you to commit a crime, would you deserve to be punished for it? Would 
you deserve to have me remain at the controls? 
The theory of retribution rests on the public’s erroneous conception of free 
will, and perpetuates a moral confusion. Furthermore, by instituting retribution 
as a legitimate punishment, we waste our scientific and legal efforts on creating 
spurious distinctions in responsibility when we should be evaluating the effica-
cy of, and enhancing, our other theories of punishment.243 Thus, as Roscoe 
Pound wrote in 1922, “in order to deal with crime in an intelligent and practical 
manner we must give up the retributive theory.”244 
III. A WORLD WITHOUT FREE WILL 
A. Could We Still Adequately Punish Criminals? 
This Note has argued that the popular conception of free will is an illusion, 
and that its widespread acceptance has influenced our law and legal structure in 
a deleterious manner, especially with regard to retribution. These arguments are 
by no means generally accepted,245 and it is very likely that many readers may 
have concerns regarding this proposal. This section will attempt to address 
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these concerns, and reassure the reader that no major reformation of our gov-
ernment or way of life is required in a world without free will. 
One of the most common reactions to the idea that humans lack free will, 
and thus cannot be blamed for their behavior, is the belief that we are then un-
der an obligation to free all criminals from confinement and that all basis for 
punishing criminals is lost. As Judge Evelle Younger stated, “If society is 
wholly responsible, why not apologize to the cutthroat and pension him for 
life? If you don’t hang him, why imprison him? He surely needs neither gal-
lows nor cell if the blame is all on the universe at large.”246 In terms of retribu-
tive punishments, this is true. There is no sense in which one deserves to be 
hanged or deserves to be incarcerated. However, consequentialist punishments 
do not rely on notions of free will, blame, or moral responsibility.247 Regardless 
of whether you freely choose to act, punishing you may: (1) deter you (or oth-
ers) from committing similar conduct and harming others; (2) reform you so 
you are less likely to commit similar conduct and harm others, or; (3) incapaci-
tate you so you are unable to commit similar conduct and harm others.248 As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. phrased it in a letter to British political theorist 
Harold Laski: 
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged . . . 
I should say, I don’t doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it 
more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You 
may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law 
must keep its promises.249 
To illustrate the utility of punishments in the absence of free will, again, an 
analogy to animals seems appropriate. When a bear escapes a zoo and roams 
the streets, thereby endangering everyone nearby, we typically do not think of 
the bear as freely choosing its behavior.250 Rather, most of us recognize that a 
bear has no choice except to act in accord with its genetically derived in-
stincts.251 Nonetheless, this does not, and should not, prevent us from recogniz-
ing the real threat the bear poses to others and taking action accordingly.252 
Capturing and confining the bear seems like an ideal solution; reforming the 
bear so it became as friendly as a domesticated dog would be even better if it 
were possible. 
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The value incapacitation serves regardless of the existence of free will 
seems rather self-evident; regardless of the true origins of human behavior, 
locking you up will prevent you from harming others in open society.253 How-
ever, the value of deterrence in a world without free will seems to merit special 
attention, as many legal scholars and courts are under the impression that deter-
rence, like retribution, would cease to be an effective legal punishment.254 The 
argument is as follows: “deterrence can only be effective where the actor can 
consider the consequences of her acts and make a rational choice to refrain 
from the act because of the threat of punishment,” and thus “the only truly de-
terrable acts are ones that are also freely chosen.”255 After all, the bear from the 
previous example certainly seems undeterrable, so one might wonder why a 
human would be any different. 
There is a point to this argument: not all behavior is effectively deterrable. 
Involuntary behavior, or behavior that occurs without the felt intention of carry-
ing it out (e.g., shivering, yawning, sleepwalking, sneezing, etc.), would be dif-
ficult to deter.256 However, the idea that voluntary behavior cannot be deterred 
without free will is simply false, and a negative relationship between punish-
ment and crime rate is compatible with a deterministic view of human behav-
ior.257 In theory, all that is required for deterrence to be effective is that the ac-
tor is capable of understanding the potential consequences of his conduct, and 
that the actor can be influenced by that understanding.258 If we could success-
fully communicate to all bears that they will be hunted down and killed the 
moment they attack any human (i.e., if bears were capable of understanding 
what that meant), many bears probably would be deterred from attacking hu-
mans. While it is impossible to communicate in this way to bears, no such 
problem exists with regard to humans. 
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Even though people are theoretically capable of being deterred, the degree 
to which they actually are deterred by certain punishments is a legitimate ques-
tion that has drawn much attention, yet remains largely inconclusive.259 This is 
largely due to the difficulty in accurately identifying the causal relationship be-
tween a change in punishment (e.g., an increase in sentence length), and the de-
terrent effect.260 However, there is less of a debate on whether incarceration has 
some deterrent effect on the general population, and more of a debate as to the 
extent of the deterrent effect.261 There are generally two ways in which pun-
ishments deter behavior. First, they influence our understanding of how certain 
we are to be punished (e.g., if the police department always has an officer 
watching a certain street for speeding, and the public knows this, chances are 
fewer people will speed on that street).262 Second, they influence our under-
standing of how severely we will be punished (e.g., the rationale underlying 
mandatory minimum sentences and “three-strikes” laws).263 Although the effi-
cacy of changing the certainty and severity of various punishments in deterring 
behavior is an open question for the sciences, attempting to find moral ways of 
increasing the deterrent effect of various punishments is a legitimate project re-
gardless of the underlying causes of human behavior. Furthermore, an argu-
ment that deterrence is an ineffective justification for legal punishment is a non 
sequitur if used to show that retribution is either moral or justified as a legal 
punishment. The same is true concerning the efficacy of rehabilitative pro-
grams. 
Deterrence also merits special attention because people often conflate de-
terminism with fatalism.264 The confusion arises from the following faulty log-
ic: “if everything is determined, then law cannot affect people’s behavior be-
cause they are already destined to engage in whatever behavior they do engage 
in.”265 This is the view the government’s attorney took in the case against Leo-
pold and Loeb, declaring that under Darrow’s philosophy, “there ought not to 
be any law and there ought not to be any enforcement of the law.”266 However, 
this is simply not the case. Actions are not “destined” to arise, regardless of 
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previous conditions and circumstances. On the contrary, actions arise as a di-
rect result of previous conditions and circumstances. 
To help demonstrate the point, imagine the following hypothetical. Imag-
ine that you have been pulled over for speeding (or, if you actually have been 
pulled over for speeding, reflect on that moment). Were you destined to be 
pulled over at that moment, regardless of what laws existed at the time? What if 
there had been a widely known and frequently enforced law that made the pen-
alty for speeding death by guillotine? Would you have still gone over the speed 
limit? Even if you would have, would everyone else? 
There is no “destiny” that transcends causation. This is precisely why we 
have laws—to encourage people to do things they might not otherwise do in 
absence of the law, and to deter people from engaging in certain conduct they 
might otherwise engage in without the law. The law really does affect behavior. 
“[I]ndividuals do tend to buy less candy when the price rises and steal fewer 
televisions when the penalty increases.”267 Thus, deterrence (like incapacitation 
and rehabilitation) is a valid justification for punishment even in the absence of 
free will. 
B. How Much Would Have to Change? 
Many believe that something important about our subjectivity would be 
lost without the conventional notion of free will. Legally, many worry that, 
without some form of retribution, any alternative efforts to meet a victim’s 
needs would be inadequate. Psychologically, many worry that we would be 
rendered mere “meat machines” or “meat computers” without free will, and 
thus much of the magic and beauty of our experience would be unfounded.268 
However, recognizing the true causes of human behavior need not diminish our 
experiences or irreparably harm our system of punishment. 
One reason many find retribution to be a necessary justification for pun-
ishment is that the victims of various crimes (and often, the family and friends 
of the victims) need the psychological satisfaction of observing the punishment 
of an offender, and that alternatives would not adequately meet this need.269 
This is an interesting point, as most of us have experienced a powerful, if not 
overwhelming, desire for revenge, whether it be from a real life event or from 
empathizing with characters from works of fiction.270 However, this argument 
is not a justification for retribution. If we implemented punishments due to this 
concern, we would not be punishing offenders because they deserved it; rather, 
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we would be punishing offenders because of the beneficial consequences that 
result from such punishments (e.g., the emotional and psychological satisfac-
tion of the victims). Thus, such punishments would have a consequentialist jus-
tification, not a retributive one. 
Nevertheless, this consequentialist justification for punishment is also 
problematic. Aside from merely establishing a “sham form of retribution,” it 
merely perpetuates the deeper problem; most people do not understand the un-
derlying causes of human behavior, and this misunderstanding leads to unnec-
essary anguish and bitterness.271 Victims often desire retribution and revenge 
because of the illusion of free will. We should not be encouraging or indulging 
these desires on an institutional level; we should be exposing their fallacious 
underpinnings. In fact, recognizing the true causes of human behavior and dis-
posing of desires for revenge can be psychologically beneficial. For example, 
in 2006, when Charles Roberts barricaded himself within an Amish school-
house, tied up ten young girls, and systematically shot each one before taking 
his own life, the community reacted in the most inspiring way.272 Rather than 
living with hatred and bitterness from the event, they showed nothing but love 
and forgiveness for the killer and his family.273 They even attended the killer’s 
funeral.274 Notably, Roberts had apparently been “acting out in revenge for 
something that happened [twenty] years ago.”275 This reveals a striking and in-
structive contrast: while Roberts had been overwhelmed by anger due to an 
event that occurred twenty years ago, the community did not spend a single day 
harboring such caustic thoughts.276 Which mindset would you rather live with, 
a mind riddled with hate or one that is at ease? 
Another concern many have with the idea that humans lack free will is that 
such a thesis would force us to abandon many of our natural reactive attitudes 
(e.g., “regret, resentment, blame, praise, love”) and that such an abandonment 
is utterly unappealing or would entirely strip our lives of meaning.277 There-
fore, many feel that we must continue to live and act as if we have free will, re-
gardless of whether we do in fact have it.278 There are several ways to address 
this concern. First, it must be conceded that some of these reactive attitudes 
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would need to be relinquished.279 However, attitudes such as resentment and 
antipathy underlie our desires to blame and condemn others for their conduct. 
These sentiments only give rise to vitriol analogous to the reactions to Ariel 
Castro’s suicide mentioned earlier.280 It is hard to see what appreciable loss 
would arise if we no longer shared these sentiments, and doing so would likely 
foster a more compassionate society, where we focus on helping and treating 
others rather than blaming them. Additionally, we would not be rendered insen-
sate without free will. Not all of our emotions and reactive attitudes are de-
pendent upon our viewing others as conscious agents who are able to behave 
differently. Indeed, emotions such as love and fear would be unaffected by the 
loss of free will.281 
Secondly, the realistic goal is not to rid each and every individual of his or 
her sense of free will.282 Even those who believe free will is an illusion often 
develop the urge to blame others for their conduct.283 Rather, the goal is to cre-
ate a criminal justice system that transcends the moral failings of the individual. 
If we cease to recognize retributive justifications for punishment as legitimate, 
our day-to-day reactive attitudes would be largely unaffected. Noticeable 
change would only occur within the legal sphere, where we could attempt to 
avoid outcomes driven by a notion of free will, such as Patty Hearst’s convic-
tion. This is something worth striving for, not something to be concerned about. 
Our system of criminal justice is no less important in a world without free 
will. Regardless of whether you freely chose to commit a crime, we still need to 
know whether it was you who in fact committed the crime, and what risk you 
pose to others in the future. Our substantive criminal law would not need to un-
dergo substantial changes either. Rather, we would merely alter the way in 
which we describe much of it. A “voluntary act” would be an act that is accom-
panied by the felt intention of carrying it out, rather than one that is the result of 
free choice.284 We could still distinguish between someone who committed a 
crime intentionally and someone who did so negligently; we simply would not 
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view the offenders as more or less blameworthy, but rather as more or less like-
ly to perpetrate future harm. We could recognize that persons who act out of 
necessity, or under duress, are less of a threat to society without being bogged 
down by questions of whether the actor had free will or whether his will was 
overborne. We could acknowledge that there is a continuum of possible mental 
stability, defined by the stable majority on one end and the classically “insane” 
on the other, without engaging in some sort of responsibility calculus.285 We 
could recognize that those at the “insane” end of the spectrum may pose more 
of a threat to society, and thus require special attention with regard to punish-
ment. However, our sympathy would go out not only to the “insane,” but also 
to the Leopold and Loeb types, whose genetics have placed them among their 
ranks.286 
In fact, our language need not even change. Statements like “I chose,” “he 
decided,” and “you should have” are still useful in a world without free will. 
Saying, “I went to Baskin Robbins and chose chocolate ice cream,” simply 
states that while you were at Baskin Robbins, you understood that there were 
several different flavors of ice cream, reasons were coming to you that were 
making certain flavors more appealing than others, and that you ended up se-
lecting chocolate for one reason or another. Although in a deeper, philosophical 
sense you did not have the capacity to “choose” a different flavor, saying that 
you chose a certain flavor still accurately reflects your mindset at that time. 
Saying, “You should have chosen vanilla; that’s their best flavor,” simply 
means that you think he would have been happier if the state of the universe 
had been slightly different in a way that led him to select vanilla, and that per-
haps he should do so in the future. It need not imply that you actually had the 
capacity to bring about the other scenario in the past. 
Most concerns about the deleterious effects of a world without free will are 
exaggerated or confused. A sweeping overhaul of our criminal justice system 
would not be necessary (or even desirable), and our subjective experience 
would be no less important or valuable. In fact, recognizing the true causes of 
human behavior would likely lead to a more compassionate society, where we 
are no longer encumbered by a desire to see others suffer. 
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CONCLUSION 
In 1909, Roscoe Pound made clear what many are unwilling to accept to-
day: “[O]ur criminal law is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral 
responsibility and juridical ideas of retribution, and both criminal law and pro-
cedure are so thoroughly mechanical, that we by no means make what we 
should of our [scientific] discoveries.”287 He considered our criminal law to be 
“the most archaic part of our legal system.”288 Although his words are now over 
one hundred years old, they are as true today as they were then. 
Philosophically, this Note does not suggest that strict determinism is 
true.289 Rather, this Note argues that the libertarian notion of free will is false. 
We simply do not have the ability to control the content or arrival of our 
thoughts, and thus, there is no sense in which we could have chosen to behave 
differently in the past. As most people believe that we do have this freedom of 
will, the notion has largely shaped our criminal law and societal attitude to-
wards punishable behavior. Most significantly, we feel that offenders deserve 
to be punished when they engage in behavior that is a product of their free will. 
This feeling is the result of a cognitive illusion, and validating a theory of retri-
bution only perpetuates this confusion by shifting our legal focus from as-
sessing risks to society, to assessing blameworthiness. 
Fortunately, a legal recognition that we do not have free will would not re-
quire drastic changes to our day-to-day life or to our system of criminal justice. 
The legal parlance surrounding our substantive criminal law would change in 
some respects, but a total abolition of the doctrines that may touch upon a no-
tion of free will (e.g., actus reus, mens rea, insanity, duress, necessity, etc.) 
would be far from necessary. However, retribution as a valid theory of punish-
ment must be forgone. Fortunately, since the common conception of free will 
fosters our desire to hate and blame others, the long-term consequences of abol-
ishing the theory of retribution would have a salutary effect upon our system of 
criminal justice and society in general. At some time, we must recognize that 
our metaphysical notions of free will, blame, and moral responsibility do not 
make scientific or moral sense—this Note submits that now is as a good a time 
as any. 
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